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CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN
INDIAN COUNTRY
Larry Alan Burns*
Criminal jurisdiction in "Indian country"' is a complicated and
largely unresolved matter. On most reservations, the power to
prosecute and try offenders is allocated among federal, state, and
tribal courts according to a somewhat inconsistent set of statutory
and judicial rules. Whether one or more of these authorities has
jurisdiction in a particular case is determined by a combination of
factors: the gravity of the offense, where the offense was commit-
ted, and whether either the offender or the victim was an Indian.
This confusing method of defining and delimiting patterns of law
enforcement authority has generated certain procedural problems
which are peculiar to Indian defendants.
The most novel of these problems arises when a reservation In-
dian is threatened with separate criminal sanctions by the different
authorities who purport to have jurisdiction over him. This situa-
tion usually develops when a federal prosecutor attempts to
charge an Indian defendant with an offense under the Major
Crimes Act' in a federal district court following a tribal court ad-
judication concerning the same matter. The question raised is
whether multiple prosecutions of Indian defendants within this
conflicting jurisdictional scheme violate the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy. This note examines that ques-
tion and the recent controversy which has surrounded it.
*B.A. 1976, Point Loma; J.D. 1978, University of San Diego School of Law. Member,
Catawba (Sioux) Tribe.
1. "Indian country" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970), which provides: "Except as
otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term 'Indian country', as used
in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent,
and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subse-
quently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of the state,
and (c) all Indian allotments, the titles to which have not been extinguished, including
rights-of-way running through same."
2. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, Stat. 385. Today, as amended, the Act embodies
fourteen offenses and is codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976), which provides in part: "Any
Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person any
of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, rape, carnal
knowledge of any female, not his wife, who has not attained the age of sixteen years,
assault with intent to commit rape, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault
with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burglary, rob-
bery, and larceny within Indian country, shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as
all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States."
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Constitutional Origins
The fifth amendment mandate that no person shall "be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb..."' is the basis for the legal theory of double jeopardy.
Simply stated, a person once tried cannot be subjected to a second
prosecution for the same offense. Moreover, a defendant need not
be charged with identical offenses before separate courts for dou-
ble jeopardy to exist. Jeopardy also attaches where a second
charge is a "lesser included offense"' of the first, i.e., where every
element of one charge necessarily constitutes an element of the
other. Accordingly, the principle of collateral estoppel, to the ex-
tent it applies in criminal cases, is embodied in the double jeopar-
dy protection!
Despite the apparent breadth of this doctrine, it is well settled
that the same act may constitute more than one offense when pro-
scribed by different sovereigns.* For example, where the commis-
sion of a single act violates both the laws of the United States and
those of an individual state, it is deemed two separate offenses.: In
such cases, a defendant is not protected from successive prosecu-
tions by the different sovereigns.' This result is predicated on the
belief that both the federal government and the state have separate
interests which can be protected only by permitting consecutive
prosecutions, even though a defendant is thereby twice tried for
the same act.
Because multiple prosecutions of a single defendant for the same
act are sometimes justified, the parties to a criminal proceeding
must be identified to give effect to the guarantee against double
jeopardy. A defendant may successfully invoke fifth amendment
protection only when the same sovereign is a party to successive
prosecutions' or where the courts involved are themselves "arms
of the same sovereign.' '
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). See also Gavieres v. United
States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911).; Henry v. United States, 215 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1954).
5. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). This note considers only the "cause preclusion"
aspects of the double jeopardy protection. For an article treating the "issue proclusion"
aspects of the guarantee against double jeopardy in the tribal-federal context, see Volman,
Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country; Tribal Sovereignty and Defendants' Rights in
Conflict, 22 U. KAN. L. REV. 387 (1974).
6. Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852). This "exception" to the double jeopar-
dy guarantee has been repeatedly reaffirmed. See, e.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S.
187 (1959) and cases cited therein.
7.55 U.S (14 How.) 13, 19-20 (1852).
8. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
9. 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959).
10. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387,393 (1970).
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For the Indian defendant, the requirement that parties to a
criminal proceeding be identified is crucial. If tribal courts and
federal district courts are considered "arms of the same sovereign"
for purposes of double jeopardy, then the disposition of a charge
by a tribal court bars relitigation of the matter in the federal
courts. If, on the other hand, tribal courts are thought to be
sovereign entities, distinct from the courts of the United States, the
federal prosecutors are free to relitigate charges against Indian
defendants, notwithstanding the determination made by tribal
judges and juries in earlier proceedings.
In recent years, this troublesome Indian law issue surfaced a
number of times in different federal district courts. Despite such
prevalence, a ruling squarely on the matter was generally
avoided." Furthermore, a split of authority developed among the
few courts that attempted to resolve the issue. Two cases highlight
the conflict: United States v. Wheeler" and United States v. Walk-
ing Crow."
United States v. Wheeler
On October 16, 1974, Anthony Robert Wheeler, a Navajo In-
dian, was arrested by tribal police and charged with disorderly
conduct." The charge grew out of an incident involving a young
female Indian which had earlier taken place on the Navajo Reser-
vation. Two days after his arrest, the defendant pleaded guilty in
tribal court to disorderly conduct and to a second charge of con-
tributing to the delinquency of a minor.'" He was fined and
sentenced to jail on each charge.
Over a year later, Wheeler was indicted by a federal grand jury
for the District of Arizona for carnal knowledge of a female under
the age of sixteen.' ° It was undisputed that the federal charge was
based upon the same incident and the same actions for which he
had already been punished by the tribal court. Prior to trial, the
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of
11. In addition to the principal cases discussed in this note, the issue of double jeopardy
or collateral estoppel arising out of successive prosecutions in tribal and federal courts was
raised in three recent cases. See generally United States v. DeCoteau, 516 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.
1975); United States v. Kills Plenty, 466 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916
(1973); United States v. Demarrias, 441 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1971). In each instance, the
issue was avoided and the case disposed of on other grounds.
12. 545 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1976).
13. 560 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1977).
14. Title 17, § 321 of the Navajo Tribal Code.
15. Id., § 351.
16. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2032 (1970).
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his earlier conviction. He argued that to permit a second trial in
the federal court would violate his rights under the fifth amend-
ment. The district court judge agreed and granted a motion to
dismiss, reasoning that "the defendant [had] already once been
placed in jeopardy for the same offense." 7
In affirming the dismissal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
in effect, adopted the defendant's position that tribal courts and
federal district courts were arms of the same sovereign. To sup-
port this theory, the court relied in part on dicta from another
Ninth Circuit decision, Colliflower v. Garland." There, after
reviewing the history of a tribal court system substantially similar
to that of the Navajo, the court concluded: "In spite of the theory
that for some purposes an Indian tribe is an independent
sovereignty, we think that, in light of their history, it is pure fic-
tion to say that the Indian courts.., are not in part, at least, arms
of the federal government."
The circuit court also found support for its conclusion by
analogy to two earlier Supreme Court decisions, Grafton v.
United States" and Wailer v. Florida.' Each of those cases in-
volved successive prosecutions before two courts of a single
sovereign. In Grafton, the Supreme Court held that the double
jeopardy guarantee proscribed prosecution in a United States ter-
ritorial court once the defendant had been tried for the same of-
fense in a federal military court. Similarly, in Wailer, the Court
ruled that parallel prosecutions in state and municipal courts were
barred by the fifth amendment.
Noting that the Supreme Court had never applied the "dual
sovereignty" rationale outside the federal-state context, the Ninth
Circuit emphasized that Indian tribes did not possess the sovereign
status of states.' Indeed, a distinction was clear: "The federal
government has complete, plenary control over the criminal
jurisdiction of the tribal courts. It possesses no such control with
respect to the states."' Accordingly, Wheeler was not controlled
by the series of cases which had held the doctrine of double jeopar-
dy inapplicable to successive prosecutions by a state and the
federal government." A more suitable analogy, in the view of the
17. 545 F.2d 1255, 1256 (9th Cir. 1976). The decision of the district court was unreported.
18. 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
19. Id. at 378, 379.
20. 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
21. 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
2Z. 545 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1976).
23. Id.
24. E.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959).
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Ninth Circuit, was the relationship existing between -territorial
courts and other courts of the federal government.'
Alluding to Grafton, the court of appeals concluded that the
defendant "could not be tried for the offense that he was previous-
ly convicted of in the Navajo tribal court without violating the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.""°
United States v. Walking Crow
In early February, 1976, John Walking Crow, a member of the
Sioux Tribe, was arrested on a tribal warrant charging him with
simple theft. He had allegedly committed the offense on the
Rosebud Sioux Reservation against another Indian, Thomas Stand-
ing Soldier. When brought before the tribal court, the defendant
pleaded guilty and received a misdemeanor punishment.
Shortly over a month later, Walking Crow was indicted for rob-
bery under the Major Crimes Act2 by a federal grand jury for the
District of South Dakota. He filed a motion to dismiss the indict-
ment, claiming that since he had been convicted of theft in the
tribal court and since the theft and the alleged robbery arose from
the same incident, the felony prosecution was prohibited on dou-
ble jeopardy grounds. The motion was denied and after a bench
trial, Walking Crow was found guilty and sentenced to three years
imprisonment.2
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the defen-
dant's position was fully sustained by the earlier case of Wheeler,
but expressly declined to follow that decision."° Instead, it held
that tribal courts and federal district courts were not arms of the
same sovereign for purposes of double jeopardy."0
The circuit court based its conclusion, in part, on the holding in
Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe," a case it had decided more than
twenty years before. Iron Crow stood for the proposition that
tribal courts were not creations of the Constitution or of the
federal statutes; rather, they were products of inherent tribal
sovereignty. While Congress had removed jurisdiction over cer-
tain matters from the tribal courts, the jurisdiction left to those
25. 545 F.2d 1255, 1257-58 (9th Cir. 1976).
26. Id. at 1258.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970).
28. 560 F.2d 386, 388 (8th Cir. 1977). The decision of the district court was unreported.
29. Id.
30. Id. The Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its conclusion that tribal courts and federal district
courts were arms of different sovereigns in United States v. Elk, 561 F.2d 133 (8th Cir.
1977).
31. 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
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courts was both inherent and original. " Such "residual jurisdic-
tion," in the view of the appellate court, was not compromised
merely because the United States retained plenary control over the
Indian courts.33 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit found no applica-
tion of the same-sovereign theory to the facts of Walking Crow.
The circuit court disapproved of Walking Crow's position from
a practical standpoint as well. In rejecting the suggestion that In-
dian courts were adjudicatory arms of the federal government, the
court noted that "the felony jurisdiction conferred on the federal
courts... could in instances be frustrated by relatively minor pro-
secutions in the tribal courts."3 Indian defendants, it was ap-
parently feared, would invariably elect to stand trial in tribal
courts to avoid the potential of a stiffer federal sentence under the
Major Crimes Act. Such a situation, the court concluded, would
be undesirable, and "might lead to still further congressional en-
croachment on the jurisdiction of the Indian Courts. 32
The Supreme Court's View
Late in 1977, to resolve the inter-circuit conflict, the Supreme
Court granted a government petition for certiorari in Wheeler."
Five months later, the Court handed down its decision."' In a
unanimous opinion, through Justice Stevens, the Court held that
the Ninth Circuit had erred in its finding of double jeopardy; tribal
courts and federal district courts were not adjudicatory arms of
the same sovereign.
The basis for the Court's holding, and a recurrent theme
throughout the opinion, is that the power of Indian tribes to en-
force tribal laws is in no way attributable to a delegation of federal
authority." On the contrary, such power is inherent, although "it
exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete
32. 560 F.2d 386, 388 (8th Cir. 1977).
33. Id. at 389.
3,1. Id.
35. Id.
36. 18 U.S. C. § 1153 (1970).
37. 560 F.2d 386, 389 (8th Cir. 1977).
313. 434 U.S. 816 (1977).
3'). 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
40. In footnote 28 to the opinion, the Court cryptically suggested that the result might be
different were it faced with the question of federally delegated tribal power: "By emphasiz-
ing that the Navajo Tribe never lost its sovereign power to try tribal criminals, we do not
mean to imply that a tribe which was deprived of that right by statute or treaty and then
regained it by Act of Congress would necessarily be an arm of the Federal Government.
That interesting question is not before us, and we express no opinion thereon." Id. at 328
n.2E.
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defeasance."" When a tribe exercises its power to punish tribal of-
fenders, "it does so as part of its retained sovereignty, and not as
an arm of the Federal Government."'" The Court thus distinguished
Wheeler from Grafton" and Waller," two cases on which the
Ninth Circuit had relied: "What differentiated those cases.., was
not the extent of control exercised by one prosecuting authority
over the other, but rather the ultimate source of power under
which the respective prosecutions were undertaken."'"
By refusing to limit the dual sovereignty principle to the federal-
state relationship, the Supreme Court acknowledged the signif-
icance of tribal self-determination. Implicit in the Court's holding
is a recognition that the justice dispensed by the Indian courts is
often greatly influenced by the customs and mores of the Indian
people." Such recognition was apparently deemed necessary
by the Court to insure the preservation of tribal culture.
Finally, in finding that the source of tribal power is inherent
tribal sovereignty, the Court avoided the "undesirable conse-
quences"" which might otherwise result if successive tribal and
federal prosecutions were barred. Because sentences and fines in
tribal courts are restricted," it was possible that Indian defendants
could commit serious crimes and receive relatively light
sentences.' Likewise, it was possible that a friendly tribal court
could acquit or render a light sentence to foreclose federal pro-
secution. Were this to occur, the Court feared "important federal
interests in the prosecution of major offenses on Indian reserva-
tions would be frustrated."5
Conclusion
Despite its value as an affirmation of tribal self-determination,
the Wheele 2 decision leaves unresolved the dilemma of a jurisdic-
41. Id. at 323.
42. Id. at 328 (footnote omitted).
43. 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
44. 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
45. 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978).
46. Id. at 332, n.34.
47. Id. at 332.
48. Id. at 330.
49. Tribal courts can impose no punishment in excess of six months' imprisonment or a
$500 fine. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (7) (1976).
50. The Court noted that Wheeler faced the possibility of a federal sentence of fifteen
years in prison but received a tribal sentence of no more than 75 days and a small fine. 435
U.S. 313,330(1978).
51. Id. at 331 (footnotes omitted).
52. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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tional scheme which causes the rights of individual criminal defen-
dants to be put at odds with principles of tribal sovereignty.
Through its plenary power, the federal government, which has
historically protected the Indians as its wards, can also protect its
own interests without depriving Indian defendants of the constitu-
tional safeguard against double jeopardy. One means of doing so
would be by congressional enactment of legislation restricting to
special circumstances the subsequent federal prosecution of Indian
defendants. "Special circumstances" might exist only where a
strong federal interest in law enforcement on the reservation could
not be, or had not been vindicated by earlier tribal court pro-
ceedings. Legislation of this type would permit flexible standards
of affording Indian tribes greater authority over criminal matters
originating in their courts. Such a result is desirable inasmuch as
"the basic goal of both the Indian tribes and the federal govern-
ment is to protect the public from the criminal acts of Indians in
Indian country."53
53. 466 F.2d 240, 248 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973) (dissenting
opinion).
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